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Nonprofit organizations are often evaluated using the program ratio: the proportion of 
mission-related program expenses to total expenses. Nonprofit managers have incentives 
to manipulate the reporting of financial information to enhance the program ratio. This 
article reviews the scholarly literature on program ratio management in nonprofit organi-
zations. Prior research has identified several motivations for and methods of program ratio 
management and provided limited evidence that it occurs. Researchers have explored the 
consequences of program ratio management and provided a list of factors mitigating such 
behaviors. The emerging consensus is that the program ratio is of limited usefulness in 
evaluating nonprofit performance.
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EXTANT LITERATURE PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE of many publicly traded, 
profi t-seeking corporations manipulating reported numbers to infl uence the perceptions and 
decisions of fi nancial statement users (Dechow and Skinner 2000; Graham, Harvey, and Raj-
gopal 2005; Habib and Hansen 2008; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schipper 1989). However, 
for-profi t corporations are not alone in the practice of intervening in the fi nancial reporting 
process to present more favorable results. Nonprofi t managers also face pressures to manipu-
late fi nancial results. Although their success is not measured by profi t margins or rates of re-
turn, nonprofi t organizations are evaluated using fi nancial reports.
Recently, the nonprofi t sector has grown substantially and has begun to attract more atten-
tion. Advances in technology, coupled with broader disclosure requirements by regulators, 
have increased access to nonprofit financial information. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Form 990 annual reports are now publicly available through various websites. Th is increased 
access has resulted in heightened scrutiny of how nonprofi ts spend their money, especially in 
light of several high-profi le scandals in recent decades (Dimsdale 2009; Shepard and Miller 
1994; Simross 1992). Th e role of charity “watchdog” agencies has grown, and donors have 
become more discriminating when disbursing their scarce resources. Competing with thou-
sands of other nonprofi ts for resources and knowing they are commonly judged on their 
fi nancial results, some nonprofi t managers may resort to playing a numbers game to make 
the organization look as favorable as possible. Figure 1 describes the elements of this game.
Although management of fi nancial results by profi t-seeking corporations tends to focus on 
net income, management of fi nancial results by nonprofi ts is more likely to focus on the 
program ratio (Khumawala, Parsons, and Gordon 2005)—the proportion of total expenses 
dedicated to providing programs that fulfi ll an organization’s mission. Th e program ratio is 
typically computed as program expenses divided by total expenses. An alternative measure 
is the overhead ratio, computed as administrative and fundraising expenses divided by total 
expenses (or total revenues). Th e ratios sum to unity—a nonprofi t channeling 75 percent of 
its expenditures to programs necessarily spends the other 25 percent on overhead—so their 
relationship is inverse. Another alternative research metric is the “price” a donor must pay for 
one dollar of program activity, computed as total expenses divided by program expenses. Th e 
product of the program ratio and price is unity; again, there is an inverse relationship. For 
clarity, in this article we discuss all research in terms of the program ratio.
Like earnings management, program ratio management has implications for many stake-
holders, including nonprofi t managers, regulators, and donors. Program ratio manipulation 
reduces the decision usefulness of fi nancial information and lowers the quality of fi nancial 
reporting. An increased understanding of this topic can lead to improvements in nonprofi t 
fi nancial reporting and better resource allocation within the nonprofi t sector.
Th e purpose of this article is to provide a summary of academic research addressing program 
ratio management in the nonprofit sector. This article is not an exhaustive review of the 
 literature; rather, it summarizes and synthesizes the major fi ndings of prior research and helps 
researchers identify any gaps in the literature that future research might fruitfully address. 
Figure 1. Elements of the Numbers Game
The Players: Nonprofit Managers
The Officials: Internal Governors (directors, trustees, internal auditors, audit committee)
External Governors (federal, state and local legislators, regulators, courts, independent auditors, media)
Objectives of the Players: Higher program ratios Leading to:
Better watchdog ratings More donations, grants
Better public perception/reputation Higher compensation
Strategies used by Players: Misreporting Expenses Collateral Consequences:
Misclassification of functional expenses Misleading information
Misreporting of fundraising expenses (net) Mistrust from donors
Altering Spending Behavior
Increasing program spending
Decreasing administrative spending Starvation cycle 
Decreasing fundraising expenditures
Objectives of Officials: Transparent reporting Leading to:
Accurate performance evaluation
More benefits to societyEfficient allocation of resources
Strategies used by Officials: More regulation by federal and state government
More guidance in the form of financial accounting standards
Utilization of professional accounting and management firms
Development of better performance evaluation methods
We focus on program ratio–related studies published in leading accounting journals and give 
heed to relevant studies from nonprofi t-centered journals and websites.
We explore the motivations and methods identifi ed in these studies and evaluate the evidence 
that program ratio management occurs. We examine the purported consequences of program 
ratio management, including donors’ reactions to managed program ratios, and the list of 
factors researchers suggest mitigate such behaviors. We discuss the emerging consensus that 
the program ratio is of limited usefulness in evaluating nonprofi t performance and off er sug-
gestions for the direction of future research.
Incentives for Managing the Program Ratio
Th ere are important incentives for nonprofi t managers to engage in program ratio manage-
ment (see “Objectives of the Players” in Figure 1). Th e program ratio is one of the most com-
monly used metrics for evaluating effi  ciency and eff ectiveness in the nonprofi t sector (Flack 
et al. 2004; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006). Research suggests the program ratio may 
be used to evaluate and reward managers’ performance, and charity rating agencies base their 
ratings at least partially on the program ratio. Th us, a high program ratio refl ects favorably on 
the organization as well as its management.
Most signifi cantly, research shows that higher program ratios are important to donors and 
are associated with higher donations. Large donors may pressure nonprofi ts to keep over-
head costs to a minimum, and many grantors, particularly from the public sector, limit the 
amount of grant money available for overhead (Bedsworth, Gregory, and Howard 2008; 
Keating and Frumkin 2003). Th e Nonprofi t Overhead Cost Project, conducted from 1999 
to 2004 by researchers at the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) and Center 
on Philanthropy at Indiana University, concluded a majority of nonprofi ts underreport fund-
raising and administrative expenses (thus overstating the program ratio) on their Forms 990 
as well as in fundraising materials, and donors tend to reward organizations with higher pro-
gram ratios (www.coststudy.org).
Use of the Program Ratio by Donors
Survey evidence suggests that donors consider the program ratio a signifi cant factor in their 
giving decisions. A 1988 Roper Organization survey found that 82 percent of respondents 
rated the amount spent for programs as important in their decision to contribute to a non-
profi t organization (Glaser 1994). Th e Hudson Institute (Stehle 1998) and Princeton Survey 
Research Associates (2001) had similar fi ndings. Recent studies found, on average, that peo-
ple believe the appropriate amount for program spending should be 77 or 78 percent of total 
spending (Grey Matter Research and Consulting 2012). Surveys, however, cannot tell us 
whether donors actually view or compute the program ratio before deciding whether or how 
much to donate.
A number of empirical studies have found evidence to suggest that donors use the program 
ratio in donation allocation decisions. One stream of research utilizes archival data from 
large samples of public charities in the United Kingdom (Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler 
1995; Khanna and Sandler 2000; Posnett and Sandler 1989), Canada (Callen 1994), and the 
United States (Jacobs and Marudas 2009; Marudas and Jacobs 2006; Okten and Weisbrod 
2000; Tinkelman 1998, 1999; Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986). Using a variety of econo-
metric methodologies in an attempt to control for multi-collinearity, measurement error, 
and other problems, donations were regressed on the inverse of the program ratio as well as 
other control variables. Negative price elasticities were noted in all these studies, implying 
that donations are positively associated with the program ratio. Association, however, does 
not prove causation. Wide variations in coeffi  cient estimates as well as low r-square values 
in many of the models suggest the variables included in these regressions, while statistically 
signifi cant, explain only a small part of the variation in donations. Do nonprofi ts with higher 
program ratios attract more donations because they are seen as more effi  cient, or are they able 
to spend more on programs because they have more money to work with? Is there an omitted 
variable (managerial sophistication or dedication, and so on) that aff ects both donations and 
reported program spending? It is impossible to say with certainty. Furthermore, these archival 
studies provide no direct evidence that donors actually compute or view the program ratio 
before making a donation decision.
Bowman (2006) used data compiled from a workplace fundraising campaign involving fed-
eral employees in the Chicago area. Each employee was given a “Donor Guide” that included 
a short description of several hundred charities, along with the overhead ratio of each. 
Employees had to use the guide to choose which, if any, charities to donate to. So, presum-
ably, employees must have seen the overhead ratios. Regression analyses found changes in a 
charity’s program ratio correlated positively to changes in amounts donated. Although results 
were statistically signifi cant, the economic signifi cance was quite modest, leading Bowman 
to conclude that “collectively other factors are much more important” (Bowman 2006, 306).
Stout (2001) conducted a survey experiment with seventy-six individuals comprising fi fteen 
separate United Way allocation committees in a large southeastern US city, and found that 
participants (primarily business managers and professionals) purposefully considered the 
program ratio and allocated more resources to organizations with higher program ratios. 
Buchheit and Parsons (2006) experimentally investigated donors’ use of fi nancial informa-
tion, utilizing 157 MBA students. Th ey found that 89 percent of donors who chose to view 
financial accounting information donated to the organization with the highest program 
ratio—but only 30 percent of participants chose to view any fi nancial information before 
making their donation. McDowell, Li, and Smith (2013), using an Internet-based experi-
ment with thirty-six undergraduate students, found that participants did not seem to inte-
grate the program ratio into their donation decisions. Van der Heijden (2013) conducted 
an online experiment in which 226 individuals allocated a theoretical donation among three 
similar charities, then were allowed to adjust their donations after viewing the program ratios 
of the charities. Participants adjusted donation intentions downward for the charity with the 
lowest program ratio and upward for the charity with the highest program ratio. Overall, 
experimental studies provide compelling evidence of the use of the program ratio by donors, 
but given the artifi ciality of the settings, it is unclear whether the results are generalizable.
Use of the Program Ratio by Charity Rating Agencies
Charity rating agencies, such as the Better Business Bureau’s (BBB) Wise Giving Alliance, the 
American Institute of Philanthropy (AIP), and Charity Navigator, have guidelines for accept-
able program ratios used in evaluating and rating nonprofi t organizations. Th e AIP (www
.charitywatch.org) suggests that a program ratio of 60 percent or higher is reasona-
ble for most organizations. The BBB requires a minimum program ratio of 65 percent. 
 Organizations with program ratios less than 33.3 percent receive a zero-star rating for fi nan-
cial health from Charity Navigator.
Empirical results that agency ratings infl uence donors’ giving decisions have been mixed. 
Gordon, Knock, and Neely (2009) found that changes in ratings are positively associated 
with changes in contributions for a random sample of organizations listed on the Charity 
Navigator website in 2007. Tinkelman (1999) and Chen (2009) found that meeting BBB 
standards was positively associated with contributions, particularly from large donors such as 
corporations, foundations, and grantors. Sloan (2009) found a positive association between 
donations and “pass” ratings from the BBB, although “fail” ratings did not appear to aff ect 
donations. Silvergleid (2003) found that nonprofi ts meeting the Minnesota Charities Review 
Council (a state-based charity rating agency) standards are more likely to receive higher 
donations; however, AIP ratings were not signifi cantly associated with donations. Finally, 
van der Heijden’s (2013) research participants adjusted their donation intentions upward or 
downward after learning whether the charities passed or failed the BBB’s minimum program 
ratio standard of 65 percent. The preponderance of evidence suggests that some donors, 
particularly large donors, pay attention to charity agency ratings, or at least reward the same 
qualities as the ratings agencies, when making donation decisions.
Other Users of the Program Ratio
Nonprofi t governing boards; federal, state, and local regulators; and the media may consider 
the program ratio or charity ratings to evaluate performance. Baber, Daniel, and Roberts 
(2002) found that changes in executive compensation are positively associated with changes 
in the program ratio, and infer that the program ratio may be used to monitor manag-
ers’ performance, with managers rewarded for taking actions to increase reported program 
expenses. Grasse, Davis, and Ihrke (2014) found that executive compensation is positively 
associated with the program ratio, which appears to support Baber et al.’s (2002) inference. 
In Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (538 U.S. 600, 2003), the state of Illinois, sup-
ported by the BBB and forty-fi ve other states attorneys general, sued the telemarketing fi rm 
for fraud. Charges were based on evidence that almost all donations raised on behalf of the 
nonprofi t VietNow went to the telemarketer or were used to cover VietNow’s administrative 
costs. Although the US Supreme Court ruled against Illinois, the point was made that state 
regulators expect nonprofi ts to meet some minimum program ratio standard. Th e press also 
seems to expect a minimum standard for program spending, particularly when reporting 
on public charities. Financial news website 24/7 Wall St. listed Cancer Fund of America as 
one of the nine worst-run charities in 2009, because it “only spends 17 percent of its budget 
on program services” (Berr and Stockdale 2010). Such negative publicity may be especially 
harmful to nonprofi ts, as a recent survey found the news media to be the most frequently uti-
lized information resource for potential donors seeking more information about nonprofi ts’ 
performance (McDougle and Handy 2014).
Methodology and Evidence of Program Ratio 
Management
When playing the numbers game, there are two basic strategies (see Figure 1): (1) misreport-
ing amounts spent in the functional classifi cations, or (2) altering real spending. We discuss 
these next.
Misreporting Functional Expenses
The program ratio can be improved by overreporting the numerator (program expenses) 
or underreporting the denominator (fundraising and administrative expenses). Extant lit-
erature presents two ways nonprofit managers can misreport expenses: (1) misclassifying 
expenses (including misallocating shared expenses), and (2) avoiding disclosure of fundrais-
ing expenses by netting them against funds raised. We examine each method in turn.
Misclassifying Functional Expenses
Generally accepted accounting standards and the instructions for IRS Form 990 require non-
profi ts to classify expenditures among three functional categories: program, fundraising, and 
administrative. Program expenses relate to mission-fulfi lling activities off ered by the organiza-
tion, fundraising expenses relate to marketing the nonprofi t’s image and soliciting contribu-
tions or grants, and administrative expenses relate to the overall operations and management 
of the organization. To improve its program ratio, a nonprofi t may choose to inappropriately 
classify some, or all, of its fundraising or administrative expenses as program expenses (Hager 
2003a; Yetman and Yetman 2012).
A considerable body of research examining publicly disclosed nonprofit financial reports 
shows a large number of nonprofi ts reporting zero fundraising costs despite reporting sub-
stantial contributions (Bhattacharya and Tinkelman 2009; Garven and Parsons 2015; Gen-
eral Accounting Offi  ce 2002; Krishnan et al. 2006; Scripps Howard News Service 2012; 
Wing et al. 2006; Yetman and Yetman 2012, 2013). Results suggest fundraising expenses are 
being misclassifi ed as program expenses (although it could also be a function of net report-
ing of funds raised, or the use of nonconsolidated affi  liates to conduct fundraising activities, 
as discussed later). Research also has found that many nonprofi ts report zero administrative 
expenses (Pollak and Rooney 2003; Wing et al. 2006; Yetman and Yetman 2012) or incor-
rectly classify certain types of administrative or fundraising expenditures, such as accounting, 
professional fundraising, or grant proposal writing fees, into the wrong functional categories 
despite clear accounting guidelines and IRS instructions to report them in a particular cat-
egory (Hager 2003a, 2003b; Keating, Parsons, and Roberts 2008; Wing et al. 2006).
Some costs can span more than one functional category. Shared costs represent expenses 
incurred for multiple purposes: “rent for a building that is used for classes (program expense) 
and administrative offi  ces (administrative expense) or postage to pay for a fl ier that asks for 
a donation (fundraising expense) and provides educational information (program expense)” 
(Parsons, Pryor, and Roberts 2012, 20). Th e latter example is a specifi c category of shared 
costs referred to as joint costs, the costs of combined educational and fundraising campaigns. 
Nonprofi t management can improve the organization’s program ratio by increasing the pro-
portion of shared costs allocated to programs or by misclassifying fundraising or administra-
tion costs as allocated shared costs.
In 1998, responding to concerns that nonprofi ts were hiding fundraising costs through joint 
cost allocation, the American Institute of Certifi ed Public Accountants issued Statement of 
Position (SOP) No. 98–2, Accounting for Costs of Activities of Not-for-Profi t Organizations and 
State and Local Governmental Entities Th at Include Fund Raising. Th is standard continues to 
allow organizations to allocate joint costs across functions but only for expenses that meet 
three criteria involving purpose, audience, and content. Joint costs that do not meet all three 
criteria must be reported as fundraising. However, because of the technical nature of the rules 
and a lack of specifi ed allocation methods, managers still have considerable discretion in 
identifying and allocating joint costs (Hager 2003a; Jones and Roberts 2006).
Jones and Roberts (2006) provide evidence that nonprofi ts use joint cost allocations to man-
age program ratios. Using a sample of nonprofi ts reporting joint cost activities, they found an 
inverse relationship between the joint-cost ratio and the program ratio as well as the share of 
joint costs allocated to programs. Th ese results are consistent with nonprofi ts manipulating 
the amount of fundraising costs identifi ed as joint costs, as well as the proportion of joint 
costs classifi ed to program activities, to smooth changes to their reported program ratios. 
Only about 2 percent of nonprofi ts report joint costs (Krishnan et al. 2006), so the sample 
studied is small and biased toward larger organizations. Tinkelman (2009) examined data 
from the Avon Products Foundation’s breast cancer fundraising walks from the period 1998 
to 2006 and found the organization began questionable joint cost allocation practices in 
2003, about the same time BBB decided to tighten its standards for “good” program and 
fundraising ratios. Joint cost allocations helped Avon to meet the new, tighter BBB standards. 
Tinkelman (2009) noted that, prior to 2003, Avon did not allocate any of its fundraising 
expenses to programs or administration and concluded the joint cost allocation procedures 
adopted post-2002 did not appear to conform to professional accounting standards. He fur-
ther noted, “Even if Avon could justify some allocation of joint costs to functions other than 
fundraising, its allocations to program services from 2003 to 2006 are unreasonably high” 
(491). Whether the results of the Jones and Roberts (2006) or the Tinkelman (2009) studies 
are generalizable to the larger population of nonprofi ts is debatable.
Parsons et al. (2012) surveyed more than two hundred nonprofi t executives in 2008 and 
2009 and found 20 percent admit to having revised an allocation of shared costs at the end 
of the year to improve their program ratios. Seventeen percent indicated they would be will-
ing to alter shared cost allocations if necessary to meet a target ratio. Additionally, 35 percent 
of executives admitted to choosing shared cost allocation methods based on whatever meth-
ods allowed them to meet targeted program ratios.
Netting Fundraising Expenses from Funds Raised
Under both fi nancial accounting and IRS Form 990 reporting rules, revenues and related 
expenses must be reported at their gross amounts. Thus, when a nonprofit engages in a 
fundraising campaign, it should report gross receipts as donations revenue and the associ-
ated expenses as fundraising, even when professional fundraising fi rms are used. Th e netting 
of fundraising expenses against funds raised improves the program ratio, because the total 
expenses in the denominator of the ratio will not include the fundraising expenses.
Comparing nonprofi t fi nancial reports to state telemarketing campaign reports, Keating et al. 
(2008) found 27 percent of the nonprofi ts in their sample appeared to improperly net tele-
marketing campaign expenses against contributions, resulting in overstated program ratios. 
Additionally, some nonprofi ts have been found to use unconsolidated affi  liates to conduct 
fundraising (see the discussion of Greenpeace in Baber, Roberts, and Visvanathan 2001) and 
avoid having to report fundraising expenses.
How prevalent is misreporting of functional expenses? As the studies discussed show, this 
type of program ratio management can be difficult to observe empirically. Bhattacharya 
and Tinkelman (2009) looked at the distribution of program ratios reported by 111,000 
 nonprofi ts in 2001, but failed to fi nd evidence of manipulation of ratios to just meet (rather 
than just fail) BBB standards. Th ey noted this does not mean nonprofi ts do not manage cost 
allocations; rather, any cost allocation manipulation is not centered on meeting BBB stand-
ards. Some of the research evidence is circumstantial, but compelling: Krishnan and Yetman 
(2011) compared the public fi nancial disclosures (IRS Forms 990) with the regulatory fi lings 
of a group of nonprofi t hospitals in California and found the average program ratio was 77.4 
percent when reporting to the state regulatory commission, but 86.5 percent on the IRS 
Form 990. Th is discrepancy strongly suggests that the numbers most likely to be seen by the 
public were managed upward. However, the evidence does not reveal whether misreporting 
or misallocating functional expenses is intentional. Pollak and Rooney (2003) found that 
although 16.3 percent of the Forms 990 they examined had zero administrative expenses, 
another 3.4 percent reported 100 percent of expenses as administrative. Clearly, some report-
ing anomalies are based on carelessness, confusion, or incompetence—not all are calculated 
deceptions.
Altering Real Spending
Nonprofi t organizations may also attempt to improve program ratios by making real changes 
in their operating activities (Jones and Roberts 2006; Parsons et al. 2012; Tinkelman 2009). 
Such changes can involve reducing, delaying, or forgoing fundraising eff orts or administra-
tive spending or accelerating program spending (Parsons et al. 2012).
Parsons et al. (2012) reported 35 percent of the nonprofi t executives surveyed admitted to 
changing administrative spending plans in the past to improve their ratios, including elimi-
nating planned administrative staff  hiring, forgoing computer system upgrades, avoiding staff  
training, and forgoing purchases of management or accounting software. Th e Parsons et al. 
(2012) study, however, is subject to the limitations of all survey research: low response rate 
with its potential for response bias, inability to ensure the questions were answered accu-
rately and by the appropriate person, and uncertainty as to whether expressed intentions in 
a hypothetical situation correspond to actual behavior. Tinkelman (2009) described observ-
able operational changes made by Avon to its breast cancer fundraising walks in an appar-
ent eff ort to reduce its fundraising expenses and meet the new, tighter BBB standards for 
“good” program and fundraising ratios. Kitching, Roberts, and Smith (2012) used archival 
data from a large sample of US public charities to examine how donor pressure infl uences 
program spending decisions. Although failing to fi nd evidence that charities across the board 
will manipulate overhead spending to increase the program ratio, they found that charities 
with relatively low program ratios will, in the presence of a budget increase, increase program 
spending at a faster rate than overhead spending and thus experience an increase in the pro-
gram ratio. Th e Nonprofi t Overhead Cost Project found that many nonprofi ts were underin-
vesting in facilities, technology, and human resources because of real or perceived constraints 
on overhead spending (www.coststudy.org).
Consequences of Program Ratio Management
Although the payoff s from engaging in program ratio management can be high (more dona-
tions, higher executive compensation, and better charity watchdog ratings), such behavior 
may have collateral costs and consequences, as shown in Figure 1. As Hager (2003a, 51) 
noted, nonprofits involved in this behavior may “win in the short run, [but] the bigger 
 picture points to a variety of losers.” Th ese losers include nonprofi ts themselves, researchers, 
policy makers, regulators, and donors.
Consequences for Nonprofi ts
Researchers have speculated about the negative consequences of program ratio management, 
but they have struggled to provide empirical evidence. It seems logical to assume that with-
out accurate and complete information, managers and boards may make poor future strategic 
decisions for their organizations (Hager 2003a, 2003b; Jones and Roberts 2006), but these 
are diffi  cult to observe. Nonprofi ts that report unusually high program ratios or signifi cant 
increases in program ratios may raise the suspicions of charity rating agencies or regulators, 
or arouse donors’ mistrust (Jones and Roberts 2006); but no direct evidence is available. As 
detailed in the “Consequences for Donors” section, some donors appear able to discern non-
profi ts’ attempts at certain forms of ratio management and accordingly discount these organi-
zations’ program ratios when making their donation allocation decisions. Arguably, the worst 
collateral consequence for the nonprofi t is the negative reputation eff ect resulting from being 
exposed for inaccurate or fraudulent reporting.
When organizations take strategic operational actions to improve their program ratios, they 
do so at the risk of decreased organizational effectiveness. The related literature recounts 
numerous anecdotes and case studies of nonprofi ts whose eff ectiveness was irreparably dam-
aged by failure to build productive capacity or invest in physical, technological, and human 
capital. Although Avon’s operational changes to its cancer walks helped it meet BBB guide-
lines, this move resulted in less money raised for cancer research (Tinkelman 2009). Addi-
tionally, Hager et al. (2004), conducting detailed studies of nine nonprofi t organizations, 
found nonprofi ts that spend inadequately on organizational infrastructure (fundraising and 
administration) are less eff ective at carrying out their missions than nonprofi ts that spend 
more appropriate amounts. Known as the “starvation cycle” (Gregory and Howard 2009), 
this phenomenon has been described as “a debilitating trend of under-investment in organi-
zational infrastructure that is fed by potentially misleading fi nancial reporting and donor 
expectations of increasingly low overhead expenses” (Lecy and Searing 2015, 539; see also 
Pallotta 2008).
A decade after the starvation cycle was fi rst described and decried by Hager et al. (2004), 
Lecy and Searing (2015) used a panel of archival data to empirically explore its existence and 
parameters. Th ey discovered overhead ratios declined (meaning program ratios increased) 
steadily by 2.6 percentage points from 1985 to 2010, with a larger decline in administrative 
expenses (fundraising ratios actually increased slightly during that time period). Although 
they cannot discern how much of that change is due to spending changes and how much 
might be due to reporting or allocation changes, either way, it indicates an alarming trend.
Consequences for Researchers, Policy Makers, and Regulators
Researchers, policy makers, and governmental regulators use nonprofit reports to better 
understand, evaluate, and govern the nonprofi t sector (Hager 2003a, 2003b; Krishnan et al. 
2006). Just as inaccurate or incomplete expense information can lead to poor future strategic 
management decisions, research based on inaccurate expense information or expense activ-
ity that deviates from normal operating practices can lead to erroneous research conclusions. 
Public policy or governance decisions based on this research may not turn out to be in the 
public’s or the nonprofi t sector’s best interests (Hager 2003a); however, no research to date 
has provided empirical evidence of this occurring.
Consequences for Donors
If donors rely on nonprofi ts’ reported program ratios when making donation decisions, man-
aged numbers can lead to nonprofi t resource misallocation; that is, donors could contribute 
to nonprofi ts that use funds in ways that are not in the public’s best interest (Hager 2003a; 
Jones and Roberts 2006; Krishnan et al. 2006; Yetman and Yetman 2012). Consequences of 
ratio management lessen if donors are sophisticated enough to detect and adjust for misre-
ported items. Previous research provides mixed results regarding donors’ abilities to unravel 
program ratio management. Most of this research focuses on two types of ratio management: 
(1) reporting of zero fundraising, which is fairly obvious upon a casual perusal of the Form
990; or (2) over-allocating joint costs to program services, which requires more diligent eff ort
on the part of the donor to detect.
Yetman and Yetman (2013) performed a regression of donations on the program ratio and 
the usual control variables and included an indicator variable with value of one for zero 
reported fundraising, as well an interaction variable. Although the coeffi  cients for the pro-
gram ratio and the indicator variable were strongly and signifi cantly positive, the coeffi  cient 
for the interaction of the two was strongly and signifi cantly negative. Th is fi nding provides 
evidence that donors discount, to some degree, the program ratio when making donation 
decisions for organizations that report zero-fundraising expenses. After adding an additional 
variable (and interaction variables) for donor sophistication, proxied by the ratio of restricted 
funds to total fund balances, the researchers concluded more sophisticated donors attach a 
larger discount to infl ated program ratios. Th ese results suggest donors are able to at least 
partially see through the zero-fundraising-expense form of program ratio management.
Th ree studies examined donors’ reactions to misallocation of shared costs. Tinkelman (1998) 
used a sample of 191 large nonprofit organizations from 1990 to 1992 and employed a 
nonlinear regression of total donations on price, which was defi ned as unity minus the per-
centages of administrative, fundraising, and joint costs—in other words, the program ratio 
without any joint costs included as program expenses. He measured a coeffi  cient for the joint 
cost variable to capture whether donors considered joint costs as similar to overhead costs 
(in which case the coeffi  cient would be close to 1), or if donors considered joint costs to be 
valid program expenses, evidenced by a coeffi  cient of zero (a negative coeffi  cient would imply 
that joint costs are valued more highly than program service expenses). Th e coeffi  cient of the 
joint cost variable had no statistical signifi cance for the full sample; but when he examined 
diff erent categories of donors, his tests revealed large donors (corporations, foundations, and 
grantors of legacies) treat joint costs similarly to fundraising, but small donors (individu-
als) appeared to disregard joint cost allocations or else to accept the validity of the amounts 
reported as program-related joint costs.
Khumawala et al. (2005) conducted an experiment with sophisticated donors (thirty-two 
executives and fi nancial offi  cers) and unsophisticated donors (ninety-three students) who 
were asked to analyze fi nancial information for two competing nonprofi ts and decide how 
much of a stated contribution to allocate to each of them. Th e two entities were essentially 
identical except for the way in which they allocated joint costs. One organization appeared to 
spend less on fundraising than the other, unless the footnote disclosures were used to undo 
the joint cost allocation. Both groups of donors appeared to accept the credibility of reported 
program ratios and ignored the eff ects of joint cost allocations in making donation decisions.
Flynn (2003), in a similar experiment, asked sixty-four MBA students to allocate a stated 
contribution between two competing nonprofi ts after analyzing fi nancial reports. He found 
that even when those fi nancial reports contained signs of highly questionable shared cost 
allocations that would infl ate the program ratio, such as an unusually large percentage of 
offi  cers’ and directors’ compensation allocated to program expense, half the participants still 
allocated the donation to the nonprofi t with the higher program ratio. Overall, prior research 
indicates that while some donors appear to discern certain forms of program ratio manage-
ment and adjust their contribution decisions, many do not, resulting in nonprofi ts often suf-
fering no immediate consequences for misleading donors with infl ated program ratios.
Mitigating Factors on Program Ratio 
Management
As shown in Figure 1, the offi  cials of the numbers game include internal and external gov-
ernors and regulators of the nonprofi t sector; their strategies include regulation, guidance, 
and oversight. Past studies have investigated several factors that might mitigate program ratio 
management, including fi rm characteristics and various internal and external governance 
mechanisms. Increasingly, however, researchers and thought leaders are imploring for better 
methods of evaluating nonprofi t performance.
Firm Characteristics and Internal and External Governance 
Mechanisms
Firm characteristics associated with less likelihood of program ratio management include 
larger size (Keating et al. 2008; Krishnan and Yetman 2011; Krishnan et al. 2006; Parsons et 
al. 2012), older age (Krishnan and Yetman 2011; Tinkelman 1999), better fi nancial health 
(Krishnan et al. 2006), less dependence on donations as a funding source (Krishnan and 
 Yetman 2011; Krishnan et al. 2006; Parsons et al. 2012), higher executive salaries ( Keating 
et al. 2008), use of professional outside accountants or more experienced management (Keat-
ing et al. 2008; Krishnan and Yetman 2011; Krishnan et al. 2006; Parsons et al. 2012), use 
of accrual accounting (Keating et al. 2008), and IRC 501(c)(3) organization type ( Keating et 
al. 2008). Findings suggest that some of the program ratio management identifi ed in earlier 
research may be the result of a lack of sophistication or expertise by the nonprofi ts’ managers 
or accountants.
Internal governance mechanisms negatively associated with misreporting include board com-
pensation, board independence, and the presence of an audit committee (Krishnan and Yet-
man 2011; Yetman and Yetman 2012). Forms of external monitoring that are associated with 
less misreporting include capital provider monitoring (as a result of municipal bond issuance 
or receipt of donor-restricted contributions), greater federal and state regulatory oversight 
(through engagement in taxable activities and location in states with higher levels of state reg-
ulation and enforcement), undergoing a fi nancial statement audit, and the enactment of bet-
ter fi nancial accounting guidance such as SOP No. 98–2 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Garven and Parsons 2015; Keating et al. 2008; Krishnan et al. 2006; Yetman and  Yetman 
2012). Additionally, extant literature provides some evidence that certain audit-related fac-
tors have a limiting eff ect on program ratio management, such as hiring larger CPA fi rms and 
paying higher audit fees (Garven and Parsons 2015; Yetman and Yetman 2012). Results are 
mixed with respect to board size and use of a professional management fi rm (Krishnan and 
Yetman 2011; Yetman and Yetman 2012).
Alternative Measures of Nonprofi t Performance
Perhaps the best remedy for program ratio management would be for donors, charity rat-
ing agencies, and other stakeholders of nonprofi t organizations to take a more broad-based 
approach to evaluating nonprofi t eff ectiveness and effi  ciency rather than focusing on a single 
ratio. Thought leaders in the nonprofit sector decry the widespread overreliance on high 
program ratios (or low fundraising and overhead ratios) to identify nonprofi ts worthy of sup-
port, noting that overemphasis on fi nancial ratios places undue pressure on management to 
“manage” those ratios (Bedsworth et al. 2008; Hager 2003a, 2003b; Pallotta 2008; Pollak 
and Rooney 2003). At the forefront of this criticism is the Overhead Myth campaign, an 
important movement with broad support from GuideStar, the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 
and Charity Navigator, to end “the false conception that fi nancial ratios are the sole indicator 
of nonprofi t performance” (overheadmyth.com).
Manipulated or not, there are several reasons why the program ratio is an inadequate measure 
of nonprofi t performance. Steinberg (1983, 1986, 1988–89) stressed that the program ratio 
is based on average, historical data, while economic theory suggests donors should base their 
decisions on future, marginal data. Recent research shows future marginal program ratios are 
not highly correlated with past average ratios (Tinkelman 2004). Flack et al. (2004) noted 
the program ratio does not measure organizational eff ectiveness at all, because an organiza-
tion can be very eff ective at providing programs while having comparatively high costs of 
fundraising and administration.
Th e US Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to validate state or local attempts to regulate 
nonprofi ts based on a minimum program ratio or maximum fundraising ratio. In Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (444 US 620, 1980); Secretary of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. (467 US 947, 1984); and Madigan v. Telemarketing Asso-
ciates, Inc. (538 US 600, 2003), the Court has pointed out there is a wide range of accept-
able expenses incurred by charities, and that a low proportion of program expenses does 
not necessarily indicate donors are being defrauded. Th e Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, in its concepts statements on nonprofi t organizations, called for measurement and 
disclosure of eff orts and accomplishments as well as fi nancial information about revenues and 
expenditures.
Tinkelman and Donabedian (2007) discuss many of the shortcomings of the program ratio 
as a measure of eff ectiveness or effi  ciency. Th ey present an alternative framework for evaluat-
ing nonprofi ts that includes not only the program ratio but also measures of percentage of 
revenues spent, outputs produced, and quality of those outputs. Th e Robin Hood Founda-
tion, a nonprofi t with the objective of ending poverty in New York City, uses benefi t-cost 
analysis and qualitative information about programs as a basis for grant decisions. Th eir met-
rics allow comparison of impact across programs, no matter how dissimilar (www. robinhood
.org). Guidestar, in its strategic plan, Guidestar 2020, states its goal to help transform the non-
profi t sector into “a community powered by information and characterized by smart decisions” 
(Guidestar 2015). Th e Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation donated $3 million to help achieve 
those goals (Guidestar 2014). With less reliance and emphasis on the program ratio, it will be 
less of a target for manipulation; furthermore, potential manipulation of fi nancial ratios will 
have less negative impact if users are also examining other measures of nonprofi t performance.
Conclusion
Th is article provides a summary of scholarly research addressing program ratio management 
in the nonprofi t sector: the motivations, the methods, the consequences, and the remedies. 
Research has underscored the vulnerability of the program ratio to manipulation by man-
agement, either by misreporting or misallocating costs or by making operating decisions 
that will improve the ratio in the short run. Although there is some empirical evidence that 
misreporting and altering of real spending takes place, there is less evidence of any negative 
consequences, other than anecdotal evidence of the starvation cycle. We concur with the 
growing consensus among nonprofi t researchers, however, that the use of simple expense 
ratios to evaluate nonprofi t effi  ciency is shortsighted. Th ere is an arresting and persuasive 
need to develop better methods for evaluating nonprofit performance and for identify-
ing those organizations that are best at managing their resources, and this is where future 
research should focus. It is time to leave the numbers game behind and continue the quest 
for better, more relevant fi nancial disclosures from nonprofi t organizations, as well as for 
more informed analysis on the part of the users of that information.
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